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Abstract
As the information relative to endowments, costs and preferences is dispersed among many agents , the quality of
resource alloc ation depends on the ability of markets to communicate information inside the economic syste m.
Because information is transferred through negotiation and transaction behaviors, the network of trading relations 
defines the channels through which it flows. In the present study, we use new computational tools to analyze the 
performance of two wholesale trade institutions widely used around the world: network trading and marketplace 
trading. Whilst network trading and marketplace trading disseminate far fewer bits of information than a perfectly
transparent benchmark market, they often manage to generate an allocation of resource s that is almost as good. In 
many cases, network t ading proves more effective than marketplace trading (contrary to a common 
preconception). This surprising performance of network trading is linked to a form of indirect arbitrage induced 
by connection s between networks. Implications for market design and public policy making are presented, along
with prospects for further research. 
Keywords: Market design, Market process, Informational efficiency, Agent-based computational economics, 
Multi-agent system, Decentralized market
Résumé
Comme l’information relative aux dotations, aux coûts et aux préférences est dispersée entre de nombreux agents,
la qualité de l’allocation des ressources dépend de la capacité des marchés à diffuser de l’information au sein du 
système économique. Comme cette information est diffusée par les comportements de négociation et d’échange,
le réseau des transactions commerciales définit les canaux par lesquels elle circule. Dans la présente étude, nous 
utilisons des nouveaux outils de simulation informatique pour analyser la performance de de ux institutions
largement utilisées dans le monde pour le commerce de gros : le commerce en réseau et le commerce sur des 
places de marché. Bien que ces deux institutions diffusent une quantité d’information beaucoup plus faible qu’ un 
marché parfaitement transparent (institution témoin), elles parviennent à générer une allocation des ressources qui 
est presque a ssi bonne. Dans de nombreux cas, le commerce en réseau s’a ficace que le commerce survère plus ef  
des places de marché (contrairement à une idée très répandue). Cette performance étonnante du commerce en 
réseau est liée à une forme d’arbitrage indirect induite par les connexions entre réseaux. Ce s résultats ont 
différentes implications pour la conception d’institutions de marché et pour les politiques publiques. Ils ouvrent
aussi de nouvelles pistes de recherche.
Mots-clés : Efficience informationnelle, Systèmes multi-agents, Marchés décentralisés
JEL: C63, D82, D83, D85, L1, Q13 
Article paru dans : Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 22, n° 1, 2012, p. 161-201 
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1. INTRODUCTION * 
The decisive role of markets in the dissemination of information among economic agents is 
now firmly anchored in the economic literature. Indeed, the dispersion of information relative 
to endowments, costs and preferences may make resource allocation inefficient (Hayek, 1937; 
Hurwicz, 1969; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976; Smith, 1982). By chance, markets play the role 
of communication systems (Hayek, 1945; Radner, 1968; Hurwicz, 1969; Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1976; Smith, 1982; Grossman, 1989; Kirzner, 1992). Agents reveal their private 
information through their trading behavior (search, offers, bids etc.). This information is 
aggregated in prices and other market signals, what leads to a dissemination of information 
inside the economic system. However, as the economic agents possess partial or even 
erroneous information, they are likely to behave in a way which leads others into error, and 
this can generate a cascade of misleading information running through the market. Hence 
there is no guarantee that the market process will converge towards efficient resource 
allocation (Hayek, 1937). 
It is also well-known that markets are institutions: trading behaviors must follow established 
rules specifying “who can trade with whom” and how the parameters of the transaction 
(quantity, quality, and price) are measured and negotiated. These rules determine the
performance of markets as communication systems and allocation mechanisms (Hayek, 1948; 
Smith et al., 1982; Grossman, 1989; Kirzner, 1997; Roth and Peranson, 1999).  
Market rules can be translated in the concepts of information and communication theory 
(Galtier 2002b). The rules for measuring and negotiating the different trading parameters 
(quantity, quality, and price) constitute the language of the market. The messages sent by the 
agents in the form of offers and bids are expressed in this language. Market language affects 
the (unbiased and noiseless) revelation of agents' private information regarding their costs, 
endowments, and preferences. The rules that determine “who can trade with whom” constitute 
the communication network of the market (or “market network”)1. Given that information is 
disseminated through negotiation and transaction behaviors, the market network defines the 
channels through which information flows.  
As Kirman (1987) emphasized, almost all the literature on market networks focused on two 
types of communication networks: Walrasian star-shaped networks and complete networks. In 
Walrasian star-shaped networks, each agent is only connected to a central auctioneer 
(Hurwicz, 1969; Radner, 1972; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). This is typical of a completely 
centralized market. Those studies have been criticized by Austrian School economists for
1 In the economic literature, networks are sometimes presented as coordination mechanisms alternative to
markets and hierarchies. Another approach (more fruitful in our view) considers that the network topology is an
attribute of all institutions (markets, hierarchies and others). The network gives the set of all possible interactions
between the agents involved in an institution. This approach has led to two strands of literature. The first 
analyzes the performance of network topologies without specifying the institution shaped by the network (e.g. 
Jackson, 2003). The second deals with the performance of network topologies for specific institutions such as the
firm (e.g. Aoki 1986) or the market (e.g. Smith 1982; Ioannides 1997). The present article belongs to the last 
category. 
* We thank Alan Kirman for valuable comments on an earlier draft and the two referees of the review for very
interesting comments and suggestions. 
Correspondence to: F. Galtier
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their lack of realism: they failed to capture the real (decentralized) nature of markets (Hayek, 
1948; Thomsen, 1992; Kirzner, 1992, 1997). In complete networks, each agent is connected to
all others. This is typical of a completely decentralized market (Feldman, 1973; Ioannides, 
1975; Smith, 1982; Hardle and Kirman, 1995 ; Schnabl, 1996; Roth and Xing, 1997; Kirman 
and Vriend, 2000; Weisbuch et al., 2000; Kirman et al., 2005). Most studies converge to the 
general result that decentralized markets with a complete network are efficient.  
However, many real markets are decentralized and have an incomplete communication
network (Kirman, 1997; Potts, 2001)2. Can they lead nevertheless to an efficient allocation? 
There are two different ways to tackle this question: to study general properties networks 
should have in order to be efficient, or to study the performance of specific topologies of 
networks. The first approach (which often employs game theory) was developed during the 
2000s (Kranton and Minehart, 2001; Jackson 2003; Corominas-Bosch, 2004; Ozsoylev, 2005; 
Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007; Evstigneev and Taksar, 2008; Bloch et al., 2008). Some results 
of these researches can be drawn. First, efficient networks are in general regular networks 
(with a quite similar number of connections for each agent). Second, the degree of connection 
inside the network has usually a positive impact on efficiency3. Third, efficient networks can 
hardly emerge because of positive network externalities (stable networks are usually 
underconnected) except in some very specific situations (very low link costs, specific price­
fixing mechanisms etc.). In line with the second approach, some studies have focused on 
networks with a specific topology, such as circular networks (Jovanovic, 1987; Ioannides, 
1997), lattice networks (Föllmer, 1974; Durlauf, 1994) or trading groups (Ioannides, 1990). 
These researches are less generic than those of the first approach (because they focus on a 
specific network topology) but they give a better assessment of the performance (because they 
are able to measure the distance to the optimum and, by so doing, are able to compare the 
performance of non optimum networks). Moreover, new mathematical, computational, and 
experimental tools available to the study of markets (Roth, 2001) make it possible now to 
analyze markets with much more complex (and realistic) communication networks.  
The main objective of this article is to assess and to compare the performance of two widely 
used market (incomplete) networks: network trading and marketplace trading. By the 
assessment of their performance, we want to test Kirzner’s conjecture. Kirzner’s conjecture is
that decentralized markets can be very efficient, although they disseminate far fewer bits of 
information than centralized Walrasian markets (Kirzner, 1992). If decentralized market
institutions such as network trading and marketplace trading prove to have a performance
level closed to the optimum, it would be a strong argument in favor of Kirzner’s conjecture. 
By the comparison of their performance, we want to test the very widespread preconception 
that marketplace trading leads to more transparency and a better allocation of resources than 
network trading. Indeed, there is a large consensus among researchers about the superiority of 
marketplace trading in terms of information dissemination and resource allocation. Even the
defenders of network trading (who highlight the fact that networks permit a reduction of 
transaction costs and a better access to credit), agree that, in terms of information 
dissemination, marketplace trading always performs better (Granovetter, 1985; Grégoire,
2 According to Jack Birner, it was also the point of view of Hayek who first brought to the fore that markets are 
communication systems: “[W]hat Hayek presents is a network theory of markets in which connectivity, 
frequency and strength of interactions, the establishing of new relations and the transmission of new information 
are central features” (Birner, 1999, p. 40). 
3 Except when the network plays the role of both a transaction network and an information network on unreliable 
agents (Bloch et al. 2008). In this case, a U-shaped curve was found: stability is linked to low and high degrees 
of connection, whereas networks of intermediate density are unstable. 
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1986; Fafchamps and Minten, 2001).This idea has major implications for market design. 
Indeed, in developing countries, states and funding agencies tend to favor marketplace 
trading, judged to be better for market transparency, competition, and allocation of resources4. 
We want to test whether marketplace trading is always better than network trading and, if not, 
to determine in which type of environment each institution is better. We also want to analyze 
the way in which the main characteristics of the environment influence the performance of 
each institution. 
To do this, we developed a multi-agent model (called Markets) and performed 1,800,000 
simulations. Our work was based on the example of cereal trading in West Africa, a case in 
which both institutions co-exist (Galtier, 2002 a). Empirical data were used to give a stylized
description of marketplace trading and network trading, to calibrate some of the parameters of 
the model, and to confront the results of the model with reality. These simulations showed 
that while network trading and marketplace trading disseminate far fewer bits of information 
than a perfectly transparent market, they manage to generate an allocation of resources that is
almost as good. In many cases, network trading proves more effective than marketplace 
trading (contrary to a very common preconception). This surprising performance of network 
trading is linked to a form of indirect arbitrage induced by connections between networks. 
First, we will present a stylized description of the functioning of marketplace trading and 
network trading. This will lead us to formulate hypotheses about the influence of the 
environment on the comparative performance of these institutions and to present a
methodology to test them. Then, we will present the model, the simulations performed, the 
results and a discussion (including implications for market design and public policy making). 
We will conclude with some comments on the relevance of the tool used, on the more 
interesting results and on the new research avenues opened up by this work.  
2. MARKETPLACE TRADING VERSUS NETWORK TRADING  
The market network of network trading is very different from the one of marketplace trading.
Network trading is based on a fixed network (trading relations are based on long-term
personalized relationships), whereas marketplace trading generates a changing network 
(which may be random) depending of the movement of the traders from one marketplace to 
the next. Moreover, network trading is based on bilateral trade (each trader negotiates 
separately with the different traders), whereas marketplace trading functions with multilateral 
trade. In the literature, an interesting in-between case can be found: a network characterized
by multilateral trade within a fixed network (Kranton and Minehart, 2001).  
2.1. Empirical context 
Network trading and marketplace trading are two modes of organizing wholesale trade. In 
many market chains, the organization of wholesale trade is crucial, since large-scale transfers
between surplus and deficit zones depend upon the links that exist between wholesalers in the 
production zones and those in consumption centers. Network trading is widely used by the 
Chinese and Lebanese diasporas for their international trade in manufactured products 
4 Aid agencies have funded the construction of numerous wholesale markets in African countries.
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(Granovetter, 1994). It is also widespread in West Africa, notably in the Sahel region, for 
local or regional trade in agricultural products (Grégoire, 1986; Lambert and Egg, 1994). This 
mode of organization, doubtless inherited from trans-Saharan trade, dates back at least to the 
14th Century (Amselle, 1977; Grégoire, 1986). Marketplace trading is, for its part, widely 
used for agricultural products all over the world. In marketplaces of developing countries, 
transactions are often negotiated by bilateral trade, while in other regions of the world, 
auction markets are found. In the case of agricultural products, both network trading and 
marketplace trading serve to connect wholesalers located in production zones with those 
living in urban consumption centers. In both cases, production zones wholesalers (PWs)
collect the product from producers in villages and store it in their warehouses (located in 
small provincial towns). Consumption zone wholesalers (CWs) obtain their supplies from 
PWs and sell the product to urban retailers and consumers. The case of cereal trading in West 
Africa is very interesting as both institutions co-exist in this region. While network trading
prevails in Mali (and in the other Sahel countries), marketplace trading is dominant in Benin 
and in other coastal countries (Galtier, 2002a).
2.2 Stylized description of marketplace trading and network trading  
To understand better the performance of marketplace trading and network trading, we have to 
analyze the functioning of theses two institutions, especially the topology of their market 
network. 
Marketplace trading
If several studies exist about what occurs inside a marketplace, there are very few works on 
the functioning of systems of interconnected marketplaces. Spatial integration analyses have
been applied to many types of markets including marketplace trading. (For the specific case of 
the Benin maize market, see Kuiper et al., 2003.) The studies of this type focus on the level 
and velocity of the transmission of price changes among different places. But, as the market 
process is studied only through prices, it is often difficult to explain observed differences in 
the transmission of price movements. To understand better the dissemination of information 
and the allocation of resources, it is necessary to open the black box of the functioning of the 
market with its rules and their impact on the sellers and buyers’ behaviors and interactions. 
More interesting for us is the work of Yannis Ioannides (1990) on trading groups. The system
analyzed by Ioannides is very similar to marketplace trading in the sense that the agents form 
different sub-markets inside of which occurs multilateral trade. The main difference is that, in 
marketplace trading, only the buyers move among sub-markets (the sellers pertain to one sub­
market). Another difference is that, in the model of Ioannides, the agents do not choose a sub­
market, but rather choose the number of agents with whom they wish to be connected and this 
determines the formation of the sub-markets (trading groups). However, it will be interesting
to compare the results of Ioannides with our own results on marketplace trading.  
The functioning of marketplace trading is very simple. Consumption localities wholesalers 
(CWs) travel around the production zones, where they meet production zones wholesalers 
(PWs) at marketplaces (on market day). The marketplaces, which generally function on a
weekly basis, bring together all the PWs in the zone and CWs from various deficit zones of
the country. If one tries to understand better the implications of marketplace trading for 
information dissemination, two questions arise: 
- How do the CWs choose the marketplace to which they go? From a theoretical point of view, 
there is no optimal behavior. If the market price was low on the previous market day, it may 
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be interpreted as a sign of unsold stocks and attract CWs. But such a rush on the following 
market day may induce a surge in prices. From an empirical point of view, it depends. In the 
Benin cereal market, empirical surveys have shown that the CWs almost always choose 
randomly the production zone to which they go (Galtier, 2002a). The CWs explained their 
behavior by the instability of prices, the last price on a marketplace leading to misleading 
expectations of the next price. 
- What occurs within marketplaces in terms of dissemination of information? It is generally 
assumed that the low search costs and the publicity of negotiation permit an aggregation of all 
the information held by the buyers and sellers present in a marketplace (transparency). 
However, this idea has been challenged by an empirical and computational study based on the
case of the Marseille fish market (Kirman and Vriend, 2000). This study shows that, under 
certain circumstances, there is no complete price levelling nor aggregation of information. 
Another study based on the modelling of learning behaviors shows the same result, but in a 
completely different way (Brenner, 1997).  
Network trading 
Most of the studies on network trading have been performed by sociologists or 
anthropologists, both at the international (Granovetter, 1985, 1994) and west-African levels 
(Amselle, 1977; Grégoire, 1986; Lambert and Egg, 1994). They have highlighted the fact that
networks founded on lasting relations of fidelity based on trust permit transactions at a 
distance (by phone), thus avoiding the need for expensive travel, and facilitate credit 
transactions. Most of economists have followed the same line, arguing that trade networks 
permit the solution of problems of missing markets for credit (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001)
and reduce transaction costs (Greif, 1989, 1993). However, analyses of the impact of network 
trading on information dissemination and resource allocation are less common and relatively
recent. Some authors have examined the respective roles of Sahelian trade networks and
public market information systems (MIS) in the dissemination of information inside the cereal 
markets (Egg et al., 1996). Others have attempted to link empirically the spatial structure of 
networks and the transmission of information on prices within the market (Hamadou, 1997). 
Lastly, Corominas-Bosch (2004) studied bilateral bargaining in trade networks. She focused 
on the decisive role of who starts to propose for network trading efficiency.  
Using these different works, we can give a stylized description of the functioning of network 
trading. With this institution, the entire negotiation and exchange process takes place at a 
distance. Each wholesaler in a consumption zone (CW) has correspondents (PW) in the 
different production zones (one per zone) and, in principle, should only procure supplies from 
his correspondents. Thus, when a CW wishes to buy a product, he contacts his correspondents 
in different locations (usually by telephone, or by mail delivered by truckers or taxi drivers), 
centralizes the sale proposals made by each of them (in terms of price, quality, delivery date, 
terms of payment, etc.) and concludes a transaction with the one making the most attractive 
offer. Sometimes, the functioning of network trading is completed by two mechanisms of 
flexibility. First, CWs who have difficulties procuring supplies within their network can ask 
their correspondents to try and obtain them from other PWs in their locality. Second, PWs 
who have accumulated unsold stocks can take the initiative to contact their correspondents 
CWs.  
Marketplace trading versus network trading 
There exists a very common preconception in favor of marketplace trading which is supposed 
to generate a high level of transparency. As we mentioned before, this preconception has 
induced public policies in developing countries, such as the design of marketplace trading 
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institutions. However, to our knowledge, the unique study comparing the performance of 
network trading and marketplace trading in disseminating information and allocating 
resources is Galtier (2002a). This study was based on empirical data about two cereal markets 
of west-Africa: the Malian one (structured by network trading) and the Beninese one (based
on marketplace trading). In this article, we choose a very different way to compare the 
performance on these two institutions: computer simulations. We will confront the results of 
the simulations with the results of the empirical study in the discussion.  
What are the main differences in the functioning of marketplace trading and network trading?
The two institutions differ mainly in their temporal and spatial aspects (Fig. 1). Indeed, in one 
case (network trading), the architecture of communication channels is stable over time, 
whereas in the other (marketplace trading), it is continuously changing, as the CWs move
from one place to the next. The two institutions also differ in their spatial coverage. Network
trading enables CWs to communicate (by telephone) with PWs in different production zones, 
but not to arbitrate between different PWs in the same zone. On the other hand, in 
marketplace trading, each CW can communicate at a given time with all the PWs in a single 
production zone (the one to which he has gone), but he cannot arbitrate between PWs from
different zones. 
Figure 1. Communication channels generated by marketplace trading and network trading 
(a) Marketplace trading (b) Network Trading 
: Stockpiling locality (SL)
: Production zone wholesaler (PW) 
: Consumption locality (CL) 
: Consumption zone wholesaler (CW) 
: Movements 
: Communication 
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2.3. Hypotheses 
An interesting subject deals with the gap between the performance of network trading and 
marketplace trading, on the one hand, and a perfect allocation of resources, on the other. The 
aim is to test Kirzner’s conjecture that decentralized markets can be very efficient, although 
they disseminate far fewer bits of information than centralized markets (Kirzner, 1992). If 
network trading and marketplace trading prove to have a performance level closed to 
optimum, it would be a strong argument in favor of Kirzner’s conjecture. 
Another interesting question is linked to the comparative performance of network trading and 
marketplace trading. Which institution is the better one (in a given environment) for 
information dissemination and resource allocation? The stylized description of the functioning 
of theses two institutions shows that information dissemination is very different in the two 
cases (see section 2.2). Marketplace trading looks better for aggregating information within 
production zones, whereas network trading seems to be better for aggregating information 
from different production zones. This led us to the idea that the heterogeneity of the PWs’ 
supplies within each zone should give the advantage to marketplace trading, whereas the 
heterogeneity of the PWs’ supplies between zones should give the advantage to network 
trading. What determines the heterogeneity of the PWs’ supplies within and between zones?
Obviously, what matters is the variability of supply flows to PWs. This variability depends 
partly on factors linked to the PW, and, partly, on factors linked to the zone in which the PW 
operates. For instance, illness of a PW is a factor linked to the individual. By contrast, rainfall 
is a factor linked to the zone: it affects the supplies of all the PWs in the zone through their 
effects on the date and level of harvests and on the accessibility to the villages (flooded 
roads). We choose to call “I” the set of factors linked to the individual and “Z” the set of 
factors linked to the zone. Then, we can say that I determines the heterogeneity of the PWs’
supplies within zones, whereas Z is the key determinant of the heterogeneity between zones. 
We can then formulate the following hypotheses about the influence of the environment on 
the comparative performance of marketplace trading and network trading: 
H1: All other things being equal, I [set of individual factors that affect the supply to PWs]
should give an advantage to marketplace trading 
H2: All other things being equal, Z [set of factors linked to the zone that affect the supply to 
PWs] should give an advantage to network trading 
The number of PWs (nbPW) may also play a role. Indeed, if a CW arbitrates between n PWs, 
what matters is the variability of the aggregated supply of these n PWs. This variability is
reduced when n increases. Of course, the reduction impacts only the part of the variability
which is not correlated between PWs. We will call this reduction of variability the « dilution 
effect ». In marketplace trading, each CW can arbitrate between all the PWs of a given
stockpiling locality. So, when the number of PWs in the locality goes up, each CW arbitrates
between more PWs, which increases the dilution of the variability of the supply with which he
is faced. More exactly, what is reduced is the no-correlated part of the variability (the part due 
to I). So, the more PWs in the locality, the stronger the dilution effect on the variability due to 
I. In this article, we will assume that PWs are homogeneously distributed among stockpiling
localities: the number of PWs in each locality is proportional to the total number of PWs
(nbPW). So, nbPW should have a positive impact on the dilution effect and, by doing so, on 
marketplace trading performance. By contrast, in network trading, the number of PWs to 
which each CW is connected is independent of the total number of PWs (it depends on the
number of stockpiling localities in which the CW has a correspondent). So, in the case of
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network trading, the total number of PWs should not induce a dilution effect on the variability 
of PWs’ supplies. Nevertheless, nbPW may affect the performance of network trading in a 
different way. Indeed, in the network trading system, the connection between networks 
depends on nbPW. A high number of PWs means that each PW is in contact with fewer CWs. 
CWs have fewer common PWs suppliers which means fewer connections between CWs’
supply networks. This may reduce the information dissemination among agents in the market
and deteriorate the allocation of resources. So, we expect nbPW to have a positive impact on 
marketplace trading performance and a negative one on network trading performance. Both 
effects advocate for the hypothesis that nbPW should give the advantage to marketplace 
trading. We can then formulate the following hypotheses:  
H3: All other things being equal, nbPW [number of PWs] should give an advantage to 
marketplace trading. 
H3a: All other things being equal, nbPW [number of PWs] should have a positive impact on 
marketplace trading performance by diluting the effect of I [set of individual factors that 
affect the supply to PWs].
H3b: All other things being equal, nbPW [number of PWs] should have a negative impact on 
network trading performance by reducing the level of connections between CWs supply 
networks. 
2.4. Methodology 
To test these hypotheses, we used computer simulations of market processes. The approach 
consisted in "entering" an environment/market institution pair in the model, simulating the
resulting market process and measuring the performance of the resource allocation thus
obtained in accordance with a previously defined criterion. So, the model comprises three 
exogenous components (shown in Figure 2): environment, market institutions, and 
performance criterion. We will now give some details and justifications about the way we 
choose to represent these three components in the model Markets. 
Figure 2. Methodology for computer simulation analysis 
MARKET INSTITUTIONS
ENVIRONMENT 
PERFORMANCE
CRITERION 
MARKET 
PROCESSES   
Product flows 
Information flows
PERFORMANCE
Elements "entered" in the model
Elements calculated by the model
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The environment is what determines the performance of a given institution. We see that those 
determinants may be the number of PWs and the factors affecting the variability of supply to 
PWs: nbPW, I, and Z. How could we represent I and Z in the model? A simple way was to 
represent them in the form of hazards affecting supply flows to production zone wholesalers 
(PWs). More precisely, at each time step, the supply to each PW must depend partly on a 
random factor linked to himself, and partly on a random factor linked to the zone in which he 
operates. The supply received by each PW at each step of time is a price/quantity pair. To
keep the model simple, we assumed that only the quantity supplied to a PW depends on the 
random factors linked to the individual and to the zone. This simplification is not a problem
because the performance criterion we used was exclusively based on quantities (see below). 
We assumed that, in the long run, supply equals demand. So, the expected value of quantity
supplied to each PW should be independent of random factors and should be equal to the 
demand addressed to the PW. This last condition implies that expected value of overall supply 
should be equal to overall demand at each time step. We defined a formula for the random 
quantity supplied to the PWs that satisfies all these conditions: 
qS = Ed (1 + HI i + HZ z) (1)  
With: 
qS: random quantity supplied to a PW
Ed: expected value of the demand addressed to the PW
HI: weight of the hazard linked to the individual  
HZ: weight of the hazard linked to the zone 
i, z: random variables that can take the values -1, 0, and 1 with equal probability. i and z are 
randomly determined at each time step for each PW (in the case of i) or each production zone 
(in the case of z).   
It was then possible (depending on the values given to nbPW, HI and HZ) to generate a set of 
environments characterized by the number of PWs (nbPW) and the randomness of supplies to 
PWs linked to the individual (HI) and to the zone (HZ). Note that, as qS should not be 
negative, the condition E(qS) = Ed is satisfied only if HI + HZ ≤ 1, which has some
implications on the definition of the simulated scenarios.   
The market institutions were represented in a stylized manner. The essence of network trading
is the relation of fidelity between PWs and CWs which defines trading (and communication) 
channels that are fixed in time and allow the CWs to buy only from the PWs of their network. 
The essence of marketplace trading is the movement of CWs at each time step, and the 
transparency that prevails in each marketplace. In line with empirical observations in Benin, 
we assumed that the movement of CWs to the marketplaces is random. In order to be able to 
assess the level of performance of marketplace trading and network trading, we introduced 
into the model a benchmark perfect market institution, i.e. one allowing total market
transparency and optimum resource allocation. As we assumed a total transparency at the 
level of marketplaces, such a benchmark institution can be modelled as a gigantic marketplace 
taking in all the PWs and CWs of the model. We therefore established three "sub-models"
corresponding to three different market institutions: the benchmark institution (named
"EXCHANGE"), marketplace trading ("PLACES") and network trading ("NETWORKS"). 
Last but not least, in each sub-model, all information flows passed through negotiation and 
transaction behaviors. Indeed, as we wanted to assess the performance of marketplace trading
and network trading as communication systems, it was better not to include other type of 
communication in the model. 
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The performance of a market institution in a given environment is measured through the 
quality of the resource allocation it generates. Generally speaking, the most relevant 
performance criterion for assessing resource allocation is the welfare of the ultimate
beneficiaries of trade, i.e. producers and consumers. However, in this study, we considered 
the case of a staple product (such as cereals in West Africa, which play a decisive role in food 
security because they provide most of the calorie intake of populations). This led us to focus
ourselves exclusively on the welfare of consumers (consequently, producers are not 
represented in the model). This also led us to choose a definition of consumers’ welfare based 
on the minimization of rationing, the rationing being defined by the consumers’ unsatisfied 
demand for the product over a given period of time. So, it was possible to represent the 
consumers in an aggregated manner (through the consumption localities). As we considered a 
staple product, we assumed that demand is inelastic and constant over time. It was then
possible to fix the cereal demand of consumers in each consumption locality and at the global 
level. (For the sake of simplicity, we assumed that each consumption locality had the same 
demand.) Consumers’ rationing at each time step could then be measured at each
consumption locality (CL), by resting the stocks of all the CWs of the CL on the demand of 
the CL. By summing the rationing of all CLs, we could calculate the global level of rationing
generated by an institution X in a given environment over a given period of time. The 
performance of an institution X in an environment Y could then be defined by the following 
formula: 
P [X ; Y] = D - R [X ; Y] (2) 
With: 
P [X , Y]: performance of institution X in environment Y 
D: global demand of consumers
R [X ; Y]: aggregate rationing generated by institution X in environment Y 
P [X ; Y] is an indicator which allows us to compare the performance of different institutions
in the same environment (by varying X) or of an institution in different environments (by 
varying Y). It will then be very useful to compare the performance of marketplace trading and
network trading in many environments. Note, however, that P [X ; Y] is in no way an 
indicator of the level of performance of the institution X in the environment Y. In fact, as PW 
supplies are random in the model, there is a non-negligible probability that, at certain times, 
the overall supply will be inferior to overall demand, which leads to consumer rationing. 
However, in this case, it is a physical imbalance between supply and demand, and not a 
problem of resource allocation. Optimum allocation of resources does not therefore 
correspond to zero rationing, but to the level of rationing generated by the benchmark 
institution EXCHANGE, which ensures a perfect match between total supply and total 
demand at each time step. More precisely, the optimum allocation of resources reachable in
an environment Y is given by the following formula:  
O [Y] = P [EXCHANGE ; Y] (3) 
With: 
O [Y]: optimal resource allocation reachable in the environment Y 
P [EXCHANGE ; Y]: performance of the sub model EXCHANGE in the environment Y 
To measure the level of performance of the institution X in an environment Y, we have to 
consider only the part of the rationing which can be explained by failures in information 
dissemination and resource allocation, and ignore the part due to physical imbalance between 
supply and demand. These two effects can be separated by a comparison with the benchmark 
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institution. More precisely, we defined the level of performance (LP) and the relative level of 
performance (RLP) of an institution X in an environment Y by the following formulas:  
LP [X ; Y] = P [X ; Y] – O [Y] (4) 
RLP [X ; Y] = P [X ; Y] / O [Y] (5) 
With: 
LP [X , Y]: level of performance of institution X in environment Y 
RLP [X , Y]: relative level of performance of institution X in environment Y 
P [X , Y]: performance of institution X in environment Y 
O [Y]: optimal resource allocation reachable in the environment Y 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL   
The structure of the model corresponds to a computer representation of the market institutions 
and of the environment in which they operate. Based on a scheme often used for multi-agent 
models, we divide the model description into three parts: 
- Description of the entities representing the agents, their interactions and their environment  
- Description of model dynamics 
- Description of the indicators to be observed (model outputs)  
3.1. Entities of the model 
3.1.1 Spatial entities 
The spatial entities represent the different localities in which PWs are based (stockpiling 
localities or SLs) and in which CWs are based (consumption localities or CLs). For the sake 
of simplicity, all SLs have the same number of PWs and all CLs have the same number of 
CWs. Some localities are marketplaces, where the supply and demand functions of the
different agents present are able to be aggregated and matched. This is the case of the CLs in 
all the model scenarios and it is also the case of the SLs in the scenarios performed with the
"PLACES" sub-model (representing marketplace trading). The production zones are 
assimilated to SLs: there is only one SL per zone and each SL corresponds to a zone. So, each
SL is characterized by a random factor affecting the level of supplies to wholesalers (PWs) in 
the zone for each time step. This factor is equal to HZ z, HZ being an attribute of the SL class 
(HZ is equal for all SLs) and z being randomly determined at each time step for each SL (z 
can take the values -1, 0, and 1 with equal probability). The consumption localities (CL) are 
characterized by a product demand level dCL independent of price: dCL = D /  nbCL, D being 
the global demand of all consumers and nbCL being the number of CLs. For the benchmark 
institution (“EXCHANGE” submodel), there is also another type of locality (called
“exchange”): a big marketplace to which all the PWs and all the CWs are connected.   
3.1.2 Agents 
As the model represents wholesale transactions, the only agents included are wholesalers from 
production zones (PWs) and wholesalers from consumption zones (CWs), with the consumers 
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represented in an aggregate form by the consumption localities. The wholesalers (both PWs 
and CWs) are defined by a certain number of common attributes: their name, locality, stock 
and supply function. The wholesalers' stock consists of a vector of price/quantity pairs, and 
the price assigned to the different quantities in store is their purchase price. As storage costs
and profits are considered as nil in the model, the supply function of the wholesalers is easily 
calculated from their stock as a cumulative function of quantities. If the stock of a wholesaler 
w is represented by the formula: STOCKw= {(P1;Q1);(P2;Q2);...; (Pi;Qi);...; (Pn;Qn)}, then 
i=n 
its supply function is given by SUPPLYw(Pj)= ∑ (Qi * Ai, j) where Ai,j = 0 if Pi>Pj and 
i=1 
Ai,j=1 if Pi≤Pj. 
PWs are also characterized by an "individual random factor" attribute, which determines part
of the variability in their supplies (the other part being determined by the random factor 
associated with the stockpiling locality). This factor is equal to HI i, HI being an attribute of
the PW class (HI is equal for all PWs) and i being randomly determined at each time step for
each PW. (i can take the values -1, 0, and 1 with equal probability.) So, as we saw it above,
the random quantity supplied to the PWs is given by the formula (1): qS = Ed (1 + HI i + HZ 
z). Ed refers to the expected value of the demand addressed to the PW. In the sub-models
PLACES and EXCHANGE, Ed is equal for all PWs. Ed is then given by the formula: 
D 
Ed = (6)
nbPW 
With: 
D: global demand of all consumers 
nbPW: number of PWs
Combining formulas (1) and (6), we obtain the following formula for the random quantity 
supplied to the PWs in the sub-models PLACES and EXCHANGE:
D
qS =  (1 + HI i + HZ z) (7)
nbPW 
In the submodel NETWORKS, the expected value of the demand addressed to a PW is 
proportional to the number of CWs to whom he is connected. So the expected value of the 
demand addressed to PW p (Edp) is given by the following formula:  
nbCWp
Edp = D (8)
nbCW * nbPWperCW 
With: 
D: global demand of all consumers 
nbCWp: number of CWs to whom PW p is connected 
nbCW: number of CWs
nbPWperCW: number of correspondents PWs per CW (nbPWperCW is an attribute of the 
CW class i.e. nbPWperCW is equal for all CWs).  
Combining formulas (1) and (8), we obtain the following formula for the random quantity 
supplied to the PWs in the sub-model NETWORKS: 
nbCWp
qS = D (1 + HI i + HZ z) (9)nbCW *nbPWperCW 
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In all sub-models, the random price supplied to the PWs (pS) can take the values 100, 110, 
120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 210, 220, 230, 240, and 250 with equal 
probability (whatever the PW and whatever the zone).
The CWs, for their part, know the list of the different stockpiling localities (SLs) to which 
they can go to buy cereals. They also have a network (the list of their PW correspondents) and 
a demand d. The list of PW correspondents is determined randomly for each simulation. The 
demand d is given by the following formula: 
Dd = (1 + α) - QS (10)
nbCW 
With: 
D: global demand of all consumers 
nbCW: number of CWs
α: CWs’ aversion to the risk to be out of stock (α is an attribute of the CW class i.e. α is equal 
for all CWs) 
i=n 
QS: total quantity in the CW’s stock. QS = ∑Qi 
i=1 
3.1.3 Information flows 
Information flows are represented in the model as "messages" composed of prices and 
quantities. The information held by the agents (PWs and CWs) is entirely expressed by their 
stocks (a series of "price-quantity" pairs). This information is distributed to the extent that
each agent knows his own stock but not that of the others. Moreover, this information is
subject to exogenous variations, since the supply of each PW at each time step is random.  
The random supplies to PWs represent exogenous information flows. This flows are messages 
composed of price/quantity pairs (pS ; qS), pS and qS being determined randomly in 
accordance with the formulas presented in the section 3.1.2.
The quality of resource allocation, therefore, depends on information dissemination. This
occurs via two different mechanisms: 
- Within marketplaces, all the information held by each trader (in his "stock" attribute) is 
made known. The messages sent by the traders are thus complete supply functions summing 
up all the information they hold. In practice, it is the "spatial entities” of the model that "read"
the agents' supply and demand functions, aggregate them, match the overall supply and 
demand functions obtained in this way, and calculate the price. This information (the price) is
then sent to the agents, who use it in their buying and selling behaviors. This reflects the 
assumption we made of perfect transparency within marketplaces. A marketplace covering all 
the PWs and CWs in the model thus makes it possible to use all available information, 
resulting in an optimum allocation of resources. This explains why the EXCHANGE sub­
model (used as the benchmark) consists of a single marketplace grouping all the PWs and all 
the CWs. This information dissemination procedure is also used in the other two models. In 
PLACES, this process takes place at the level of each stockpiling locality (SL) and each 
consumption locality (CL). In NETWORKS, this process takes place only at the consumption 
locality level. (Transactions between PWs and CWs take place within trade networks.)
- Within trade networks, information dissemination is very different. The messages sent by 
potential buyers and sellers are much briefer. Not all the information held by the agents (in the
13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
form of their supply and demand functions) is disseminated, but only a quantity (in the case of 
the bids sent by the CWs to their PW correspondents) or a price/quantity pair (in the case of 
the PWs' replies in the form of offers) or, lastly, a binary variable corresponding to the
acceptance or rejection of offers formulated by PWs.
In short, the information dissemination mechanisms vary according to the market institutions
modelled. For the PLACES sub-model, and the EXCHANGE benchmark sub-model, only 
information dissemination within marketplaces is used. In the NETWORKS sub-model, two 
mechanisms are brought into play: trade networks for transactions between PWs and CWs, 
and marketplaces for transactions between CWs and consumers. As the mechanism used (at 
the consumption locality level) for transactions between CWs and consumers is the same in 
NETWORKS and in PLACES, it is on the upstream level of transactions between PWs and 
CWs that the difference in performance between the two institutions is generated.  
The UML diagram displays the different entities of the model and their interrelations (Fig. 3). 
Figure 3. Model class diagram according to the UML mode of representation
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3.2 Model dynamics  
The same chronology is applied for all scenarios. The following stages occur for each time
step. First, the PWs receive random supplies in the form of a price/quantity pair which enable 
them to update their stock. This stock, expressed as a vector of price/quantity pairs, enables
them to calculate their supply function. Second, the CWs calculate their demand (expressed as 
a simple quantity). The third stage corresponds to the exchange of messages (offers and bids) 
between PWs and CWs, which correspond to the negotiation and transaction process. It is 
here that the scenarios diverge depending on the market institution (marketplace trading,
network trading or benchmark institution). At the end of the process, the stocks of the PWs 
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and CWs are updated. Lastly, the CWs calculate their supply function from their stock. The 
supply functions of the different CWs are aggregated at the level of each consumption 
locality. This collective supply function is then matched against the demand (constant) from
the locality. This gives a market price, a rationing level and a sales level for each CW, making 
it possible to update their stock. These dynamics are shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Diagram of model activity over a given time step.
The only difference between the scenarios simulating network trading (NETWORKS) and 
marketplace trading (PLACES) lies in stage 3, which simulates the negotiations and 
transactions between PWs and CWs. In the PLACES sub-model, each CW, after calculating
his demand (stage 2), randomly chooses a stockpiling locality where he goes to obtain his
supplies. Then, in each SL, the aggregate demand of the CWs is calculated by adding 
individual demands. This demand is then matched against the collective supply function of 
the PWs in the locality, obtained by aggregation of their individual supply functions. This 
determines a price and a set of transactions, which then makes it possible to update the stocks 
of the PWs and the CWs. The CWs then return to their consumption locality and sell (stage
4). In the NETWORKS sub-model, the stage 3 sequence is very different: a) each CW sends a 
message to his PW correspondents (each located in a different SL) indicating the quantity 
demanded d ; b) the PWs match this quantity against their individual supply functions and 
determine their offers (composed of a price/quantity pair, where the quantity may be equal to
d or lower if the PW does not have sufficient stocks to meet the total demand); c) this offer is
the content of the message sent back to the CW; d) the CW examines the offers received and
chooses the one offering the best price. He then sends an acceptance message to the 
corresponding PW and calculates the difference between the quantity demanded and the 
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quantity supplied by this PW. If the difference is positive (i.e. if the PW's offer does not cover
the entire quantity d), the CW sends another message to his other PW correspondents with the 
new demanded quantity d’. They make other offers (based on this new demanded quantity),
which are examined by the CW. The process stops when the CW has satisfied his demand or 
when all his PW correspondents have an empty stock. 
Note that the CWs act in succession. In other words, each "conversation" between a CW and 
his PW correspondents is completed before another CW begins contacting his correspondents. 
The consequence of this timing is that each PW only receives a request from one CW at a 
time. This corresponds fairly well to the behavior of PWs, who try to satisfy the demands of 
their CW correspondents on a "first come, first served" basis. So the CWs who act first have 
an advantage over their competitors, as the stocks of the PWs have not yet been depleted by
their sales. To represent the fact that it is not always the same CWs who act first, in the
model, the order in which the CWs contact the PWs is decided at random for each time step.
3.3. Model "outputs" and performance indicators 
As already noted, the performance indicators are linked to the level of rationing in the
consumption localities. In the model, the consumer rationing is measured at the level of each
consumption locality (CL). The rationing levels by CL are then aggregated by simple addition 
to obtain an indicator R measuring the overall consumer rationing: 
i=n j = Ni 
R = ∑(Bi − ∑Sij) (11) 
i =1 j =1 
With 
R: Overall level of rationing for all consumers 
n: Number of consumption localities 
Ni: Number of wholesalers (CWs) in consumption locality i 
Bi: Cereal requirement of consumers in locality i over one time step
Sij: Cereal stock of the jth wholesaler in locality i 
R measures the rationing generated during a time step. The rationing generated by a
simulation of t time steps is the sum of the rationing at each time step. Using formulas (2), 
(3), (4), and (5), it is then easy to calculate the indicators of performance P, LP and RLP of 
the different environment/market institution pairs simulated (see section 2.4).  
We have presented the structure of the Markets model, which was programmed in smallTalk 
using visualWorks software. It was implemented on CIRAD's CORMAS platform (Bousquet 
et al., 1998). 
4. THE SIMULATIONS AND THEIR RESULTS 
In this section, we present the experimental plan, the expected results (hypotheses tested) and 
the results obtained. The economic interpretation of these results is covered in the following 
section. 
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4.1. Model reliability testing  
We checked the reliability of the model in different ways. First, we tested separately each part 
of the program by comparing the result it generates with the expected result (calculated
separately). Second, we tested the model as a whole. To do this, we verified whether certain 
results already known were also obtained by the simulation. These simulations were 
performed with the benchmark institution (EXCHANGE), for which theoretical results are
available. More precisely, it was known that the following results should be obtained:  
a) Rationing should be nil when there is no random factor (HI = HZ = 0), as in this case, 
overall supply (supply of wholesalers) is the same at each time step. Given the calibration
of the model, this overall supply is equal to overall demand (demand from the 
consumption localities). As supply and demand are centralized, total supply matches total 
demand, and hence there should be no rationing. 
b) Rationing should increase when random factors increase (increase in HI or HZ). 
c) Rationing should increase more when the zone-related random factor increases (increase 
in HZ) than when the PW-related random factor increases (increase in HI). Indeed, in the
first case, the random factors concerning the supply of the different PWs are correlated, so 
that centralization of PW supply is less effective in reducing the variability of overall 
supply (by applying the law of large numbers). 
To test these results, we estimated the equation R [EXCHANGE] = α HI + β HZ + γ and 
tested the significance of parameters α, β, and γ. We expected that γ = 0 (result a), α > 0 and β
> 0 (result b), and β > α (result c). As can be seen in Table 1, the expected results are actually
obtained, thereby strengthening our degree of confidence in the model.  
Table 1. Model reliability testing
R-squared = 0.8772 Adj R-squared = 0.8764 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI 60942 4362 13.97 0.00 52358 69527 
HZ 196289 4362 45.00 0.00 187705 204874 
Constant 4598 2780 1.65 0.10 -873 10070 
4.2. Experimental plan 
The model Markets contains many variables: nbSL, nbCL, nbPW, nbCW, nbPWperCW, HI,
HZ, α, and D. Some of the variables were considered as fixed parameters (equal in all the
scenarios simulated). The fixation of the value of these parameters refers to the calibration of
the model. Other variables play a crucial role in our hypotheses about the performance of 
marketplace trading and network trading: the number of PWs (nbPW), the weight of the 
hazard linked to the individual (HI) and the weight of the hazard linked to the zone (HZ). For 
these, we performed sensitivity analyses. So, the values given to nbPW, HI, and HZ defined 
the different environments simulated. Combining these environments with the institutions, we
obtained the scenarios simulated. For the implementation of simulations, we also fixed others 
parameters, such as the duration of the simulations and the number of repetitions of the 
scenarios. 
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Calibration of the model. For the sake of simplicity, the number of localities must be kept to a 
minimum. We therefore opted for a configuration with two consumption localities (CL) and 
three stockpiling localities (SL). This spatial organization roughly corresponds to that 
prevailing in southern Benin, where two major consumption localities (Cotonou and Porto-
Novo) are supplied by three major stockpiling localities (Kétou, Pobè and Azovè). Above all, 
it was important to introduce at least three SLs to model the fact that, in network trading,
CWs can only choose from among a sub-set of the different SLs (those where they have 
correspondents). For this reason, in NETWORKS sub-model, the number of PW
correspondents of each CW (nbPWperCW) was fixed at two. The aversion of CWs to the risk
of being out of stock (α) was fixed to 20%, in line with observations of cereal traders’ buying 
strategies in Mali and Benin (Galtier, 2002a). The number of CWs was fixed at 60. This value 
fits well with empirical data from Mali and Benin. The global demand of consumers (D) was
arbitrarily fixed to 60,000. To sum up, the values of the fixed parameters of the model were: 
nbSL = 3, nbCL =2, nbCW = 60, nbPWperCW = 2, α = 20%, and D= 60,000. 
Sensitivy analyses. As we saw above, in all the simulations performed, the environment was 
defined by three elements: the number of PWs (nbPW), the weight of the hazard linked to the 
individual (HI) and the weight of the hazard linked to the zone (HZ). As we wanted to test the 
impact of these variables on the performance of different market institutions, we chose a wide 
range of modalities for them. For nbPW, we introduced twenty modalities: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 
21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, and 60 (3 and 60 being roughly the minimum 
and maximum observed in West-African cereal markets). For HI and HZ, we didn’t have 
empirical data (as traders are reluctant to give information on this kind of sensitive data). So,
we chose to cover a very wide range of modalities for HI and HZ: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and
100%. But a technical constraint of the model imposes HI + HZ ≤ 1 (see section 2.4), so we 
chose to take all the combinations of these modalities that satisfy this constraint. This gave us
fifteen (HI ; HZ) pairs. 
Scenarios. The purpose of this modelling work is to test the performance of different market 
institutions within different environments. A scenario of the model therefore corresponds to a 
market institution/environment pair. Three market institutions were modelled: marketplace 
trading ("PLACES" sub−model), network trading ("NETWORKS" sub-model) and the 
benchmark institution ("EXCHANGE" sub-model). Crossing these three institutions with the
300 environments defined above, this gave us a total of 900 scenarios to be tested (see Table 
2). 
Table 2. The different scenarios tested 
Variables Modalities Number of modalities 
ENVIRONMENT 
- Weight of random 
factors linked to the PW 
(HI) and linked to the 
zone (HZ) 
(HI ; HZ) (0 ; 0) (0 ; 0,25) (0 ; 0,5) (0 ; 0,75)
(0 ; 1) (0,25 ; 0) (0,25 ; 0,25)  
(0,25 ; 0,5) (0,25 ; 0,75) (0,5 ; 0) 
(0,5 ; 0,25) (0,5 ; 0,5) (0,75 ; 0)
(0,75 ; 0,25) (1 ; 0) 
15
- Number of PWs nbPW 3 ; 6 ; 9 ; 12 ; 15 ; 18 ; 21 ; 24 ; 27 ;
30 ; 33 ; 36 ; 39 ; 42 ; 45 ; 48 ; 51 ;
54 ; 57 ; 60 
20
MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS 
Sub-model NETWORKS ; PLACES ; 
EXCHANGE
3 
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Implementation of simulations. Each of the 900 scenarios was simulated over 100 time steps, 
approximately corresponding to two farming seasons, taking a model time step to be a week 
in reality (numerous marketplaces operate on a weekly basis). However, one simulation per 
scenario is not enough. Indeed, as several random variables were introduced into the model,
different simulations performed from the same environment/market institution pair may lead 
to different market processes and contrasting performances. This problem can only be 
overcome by performing numerous simulations for the same scenario. So, the performance 
indicators used are based on the mean rationing brought about by a simulation "package".
Testing showed that the mean rationing obtained from 1,000 simulations varied very little. 
We therefore opted to perform 1,000 simulations for each scenario, making a total of 900,000 
simulations.
It is now time to present the simulation results. We will examine in succession the expected
results (tested hypotheses) and the results obtained. The following section discusses the 
economic significance of these results. 
4.3. Expected simulation results 
In line with the arguments developed by some economists from the Austrian School, we
expected that decentralized market institutions such as network trading and marketplace 
trading may have a good level of performance (see section 2.3). The levels of performance of 
network trading and marketplace trading were defined as the gap between their performance
and a perfect allocation of resources. They were calculated taking as a reference not the global 
demand of consumers (like indicator P) but the amount of satisfied demand generated by a 
perfect allocation of resources (see section 2.4). The reason for this is that the global demand 
of consumers is not reachable in the model due to the occurrence of physical imbalance 
between supply and demand. This led us to define two indicators: the level of performance of 
institution X (the performance of X minus performance of the optimal institution
EXCHANGE) and the relative performance of institution X (the performance of X on the 
performance of the optimal institution EXCHANGE). To confront the Austrian School 
hypotheses, we represent graphically LP [NETWORKS], LP [PLACES], RLP 
[NETWORKS], and RLP [PLACES] as a function of the more discriminating variables of the 
environment. 
The main results expected from the simulations concerned what determines the comparative
performance of network trading and marketplace trading. The performance of an institution 
X in an environment (HI ; HZ ; nbPW) has been defined in section 2.4 as the volume of 
satisfied demand (i.e. global demand of consumers minus rationing). Our hypotheses about 
what determines the comparative performance of network trading and marketplace trading 
have been presented in section 2.3. The first hypothesis (H1) is that variability of supply to 
PWs linked to the individual should improve the comparative performance of marketplace 
trading. The second hypothesis (H2) is that variability of supply to PWs linked to the zone 
should improve the comparative performance of network trading. The third hypothesis (H3) is 
that the number of PWs should improve the comparative performance of marketplace trading. 
All these hypotheses can be formulated with the variables that represent the environment in 
the model: HI, HZ, and nbPW. The hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 can then be tested in an 
econometrical way.  
Equation (12) gives the comparative performance of network trading and marketplace trading
depending on HI, HZ, and nbPW:
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P [NETWORKS] – P [PLACES] = α HI + β HZ + γ nbPW + δ  (12) 
With: 
P [NETWORKS]: performance of sub model NETWORKS in environment (HI ; HZ ; nbPW)
P [PLACES]: performance of sub model PLACES in environment (HI ; HZ ; nbPW)
HI: weight of the hazard linked to the individual  
HZ: weight of the hazard linked to the zone 
nbPW: number of PWs
Testing hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 is then easy (we chose a significance level of 5 %): 
H1 is verified if α < 0 
H2 is verified if β > 0 
H3 is verified if γ < 0 
If H3 is verified, it could be explained by two different arguments (see section 2.3). The first 
is that nbPW has a positive impact on marketplace trading performance because it dilutes the 
effect of HI (H3a). This impact should disappear when HI = 0. (In this case, we expect nbPW 
to have no significant impact on marketplace trading performance.) The second argument is 
that nbPW should have a negative impact on network trading performance because it reduces 
the level of connection between networks (H3b). This impact should occur even when HI = 0.
Both hypotheses can then be tested. We have to estimate the following equations:  
P [PLACES] = α1 HI + β1 HZ + γ1 nbPW + δ1 (13) 
P [PLACES] = β2 HZ + γ2 nbPW + δ2 with HI = 0 (14) 
P [NETWORKS] = α3 HI + β3 HZ + γ3 nbPW + δ3 (15) 
P [NETWORKS] = β4 HZ + γ4 nbPW + δ4 with HI = 0 (16) 
H3a is verified if γ1 > 0 and γ2 = 0 
H3b is verified if γ3 < 0 and γ4 < 0 
4.4. The results obtained 
First, we will look at the performance levels of network trading and marketplace trading by 
comparing the rationing levels generated by NETWORKS and PLACES sub-models with 
those generated by the EXCHANGE benchmark institution (which permits optimum resource 
allocation). We will then present the results regarding the comparative performance of 
network trading and marketplace trading by comparing the levels of rationing generated by 
the NETWORKS and PLACES sub-models for each of the 300 environments simulated.
Finally, we will confront our results with some previous results about the performance of 
marketplace trading and network trading. 
4.4.1. Analysis of the performance levels of network trading and marketplace trading  
Figures 5 and 6 give the relative levels of performance of NETWORKS and PLACES
(depending on HZ). Both institutions reach a very high relative level of performance. The 
performance of NETWORKS is almost always above 99.5 % of the optimum allocation of 
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resources. The performance of PLACES is very good as well. In the worst case, it represents 
more than 98 % of optimum allocation of resource. 
Figure 5. Relative level of performance of network trading as a function of HZ 
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Figure 6. Relative level of performance of marketplace trading as a function of HZ 
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Let us consider the indicators of the performance levels (see Figures 7 and 8).  
Figure 7. Level of performance of network trading  
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Figure 8. Level of performance of marketplace trading
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The level of performance of NETWORKS is almost always above -20,000. That is to say, the 
difference with the perfect benchmark institution is almost always lower than 20,000 units. Is 
it a big difference? Remember that we measure the rationing during 100 steps and that the 
consumers’ demand by step was fixed to 60,000. If we consider that a step in the model is a
week in the real world, the difference with optimum allocation is around one day of 
consumption per year. We can consider this a very small difference. What about PLACES? 
The level of performance of PLACES is about -10,000 (when HZ = 0), but it falls to -30,000 
(when HZ = 50%) to reach about -90,000 (when HZ = 100%). A performance level of –
90,000 corresponds to one and half week of consumption. So, the difference with optimum 
allocation represents around five days per year. Is it a significant difference? If the rationing 
were homogeneously distributed among consumers, this difference would imply a privation of 
five days per year for each consumer, which normally is not a danger for life (except for 
vulnerable people such as children or those who are ill). But the distribution of rationing is 
not homogeneous. Scarcity entails a rise in prices. So the rationing is concentrated on the 
poorest consumers. A rationing of five-days of consumption may imply in reality a rationing 
of fifty days per year for 10% of consumers. We can then say that institutions matter: 
depending on the market institution, the level of food security of the country may be highly 
different. 
In general terms, we can consider that the levels of performance of NETWORKS and 
PLACES are very high (closed to an optimum allocation of resources). Nevertheless, market 
institutions matter: for strategic markets (as staple product), the observed differences in 
performance may have great social consequences. 
4.4.2. Analysis of the comparative performance of network trading and marketplace 
trading
We can visualize the relevance domains of NETWORKS and PLACES (see Table 3).  
Table 3. Relevance domains of NETWORKS and PLACES
nbPW
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,25 
0,5 
0,75 
1 
N P P P P P P P P P P P P 
N N P P P P P P P P 
N N P P P P P P 
N N N N N P P P P P 
N N N N N N P P P P P 
P P P P P P 
P P P P P P 
P P P P P P 
P P P P P P 
P P P P P P 
0,25 0 N N N N N N N N N N 
0,25 0,25 N N N N N N N N 
(HZ ; HI) 0,25 0,5 N N N N N N N N P 
0,25 0,75 N N N N N N N N P P P 
0,5 
0,5 
0,5 
0 
0,25 
0,5 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
N N N N N N 
N N N N N N 
N N N N N N 
0,75 
0,75 
0 
0,25 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
N N N N N N 
N N N N N N 
1 0 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
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In this table, “N” means that P [NETWORKS] – P [PLACES] > 0, “P” means that P
[NETWORKS] – P [PLACES] < 0, and an empty cell means that P [NETWORKS] – P 
[PLACES] is not statistically different from zero.  
It appears that each institution is relevant in some type of environments. For HZ ≥ 50%, 
NETWORKS is always better. When HZ = 0 or HZ = 25%, either institution can be better
depending on the others parameters of the environment (HI and nbPW). For low values of 
nbPW, NETWORKS is usually better, whereas it is the reverse for high values of nbPW.  
What explains the comparative performance of network trading and marketplace trading? The 
results of the regression of equation (12) can be seen in Table 4. The first result is that HI has 
a statistically significant positive impact on P [NETWORKS] – P [PLACES]. As a negative 
impact was expected, this leads to reject hypothesis H1. The second result is that HZ has a
significant and positive impact on P [NETWORKS] – P [PLACES], which confirms
hypothesis H2. The third result is that nbPW has a significant and negative impact on P
[NETWORKS] – P [PLACES], which confirms hypothesis H3. So, HZ and nbPW have the 
expected impacts on the comparative performance of the two institutions: HZ plays in favor of 
network trading and nbPW in favor of marketplace trading. By contrast, HI has a surprising 
impact on the comparative performance: it provides an advantage to network trading.
Table 4. The determinants of P [NETWORKS] – P [PLACES] (estimation of equation 12)   
R-squared = 0.8223 Adj R-squared = 0.8205 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI 4591 2243 2.05 0.04 178 9005 
HZ 72050 2243 32.13 0.00 67637 76463 
nbPW -304 35 -8.70 0.00 -373 -236 
Constant 2927 1805 1.62 0.11 -626 6480 
The results of the regressions of equations (13), (14), (15), and (16) are shown in Tables 5, 6, 
7 and 8. 
Table 5. The effects of nbPW on P [PLACES] (estimation of equation 13) 
R-squared = 0.8870 Adj R-squared = 0.8858 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI -67217 5702 -11.79 0.00 -78437 -55996 
HZ -261522 5702 -45.87 0.00 -272743 -250301 
nbPW 651 89 7.31 0.00 476 826 
Constant 5974848 4590 1301.75 0.00 5965815 5983881 
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Table 6. The effects of nbPW on P [PLACES] when HI = 0 (estimation of equation 14) 
R-squared = 0.9877 Adj R-squared = 0.9874 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI (dropped) 
HZ -287393 3257 -88.24 0.00 -293858 -280929 
nbPW -20 67 -0.30 0.77 -152 112 
Constant 6000243 2894 2073.43 0.00 5994500 6005987 
Table 7. The effects of nbPW on P [NETWORKS] (estimation of equation 15) 
R-squared = 0.8961 Adj R-squared = 0.8950 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI -62625 3847 -16.28 0.00 -70197 -55054 
HZ -189472 3847 -49.25 0.00 -197043 -181900 
nbPW 346 60 5.77 0.00 228 465 
Constant 5977775 3097 1930.19 0.00 5971680 5983870 
Table 8. The effects of nbPW on P [NETWORKS] when HI = 0 (estimation of equation 16) 
R-squared = 0.9961 Adj R-squared = 0.9960 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI (dropped) 
HZ -206908 1316 -157.26 0.00 -209519 -204297 
nbPW -126 27 -4.70 0.00 -180 -73 
Constant 5994534 1169 5127.72 0.00 5992214 5996854 
It appears that nbPW has a positive impact on P [PLACES]. This impact disappears when HI 
= 0. This leads us to accept H3a. The impact of nbPW on the performance of sub-model
NETWORKS is more ambiguous. When HI = 0, nbPW has the expected negative impact on P 
[NETWORKS]. But, in the general case, nbPW has a surprising positive impact on P 
[NETWORKS] (instead of the negative impact that was expected). This leads us to reject
hypothesis H3b. 
4.4.3. Comparison with previous results on the performance of marketplace trading and 
network trading  
Our results are consistent with a very robust result of the literature which states that only
regular networks (in which each agent is in contact with more or less the same number of
agents) can generate an efficient allocation. Kranton and Minehart (2001) modelled a market 
network with an allocation mechanism composed of a set of simultaneous ascending-bid 
auctions between each seller and the buyers linked to him. Corominas-Bosch (2004) analyzed
bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by an exogenously given network. 
Ozsoylev (2005) assessed the impact of informal communication networks on information 
dissemination and resource allocation within assets markets. All found that regular networks 
can be efficient and that regularity is a necessary condition for efficiency. As all the networks
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modelled in NETWORKS submodel are regular (all CWs are connected to the same number 
of PWs and vice-versa), our result that network trading can generate an almost optimum 
allocation is consistent with the previous literature on this subject. Moreover, the fact that
network trading proves to be often more efficient than marketplace trading also confirms that
regularity favors efficiency. Indeed, marketplace trading generate irregular networks: as CWs
choose randomly the marketplace to which they go, the number of CWs is different in each
marketplace and, as a consequence, each PW is connected to a different number of CWs. 
Another strong result confirmed here is that the degree of connection inside the network has 
usually a positive impact on efficiency. More specifically, Jackson (2003) showed that if 
networks are such that each individual has at least two links, then there is no problem of 
compatibility between efficiency and (pairwise) stability. Our results are consistent with 
Jackson’s because the trade networks represented in the model are very stable (according to
empirical evidence in Sahel), prove to be efficient (according to simulation results), and
satisfy the condition that each agent is at least connected to two other agents. Our results are 
also consistent with previous results about risk-sharing networks. Indeed, Bramoullé and 
Kranton (2007) showed that networks which connect (indirectly) all individuals can lead to 
the optimum (full insurance). As in almost all the simulations performed, all agents are
(indirectly) connected, the very good performance of network trading confirms Bramoullé and 
Kranton’s result. By contrast, the relatively bad performance of marketplace trading may be 
explained by the disconnection of the different marketplaces (each PW and each CW acts 
only in one marketplace at a time). Indeed, efficient allocation can be reached by a set 
multilateral bargaining if there are overlaps between them (Kranton and Minehart 2001).  
Another interesting result is provided by the theory of trading groups, as presented by 
Ioannides (1990). As it is specific to multilateral trade, it can only be compared with our 
results on the performance of marketplace trading.  For Ioannides, the market process inside 
each trading group may be regulated by a Walrasian mechanism (as in our model for 
marketplace trading) or by a multi-person Nash bargaining mechanism. He found that, in both 
cases, the expected utility of trade grows with the size of the group. This is consistent with 
our result that the performance of marketplace trading grows with the number of PWs per
marketplace. 
Corominas-Bosch (2004) gave an interesting result specific to the case of bilateral trade that 
can be compared with our results on network trading. More precisely, she gave a sufficient 
condition for (regular) networks to be efficient. This condition states that, when the number of 
sellers is different from the number of buyers, if the long side starts to propose, the network 
always leads to an efficient allocation (otherwise, the uniqueness of the efficient allocation is 
not guaranteed). When the number of sellers equals the number of buyers, if the discount rate 
is small enough, the network is always efficient (otherwise, the uniqueness of the efficient 
allocation is not guaranteed). In Markets, CWs always start to propose, and in most of the 
scenarios we have nbCW > nbPW. So, the long side starts to propose. According to 
Corominas-Bosch 2004, this should imply that the network should always be efficient. In the 
others scenarios, we have nbPW = nbCW. As there is no discount rate in the model, according 
to Corominas-Bosch 2004, we should also expect always-efficient networks. Nevertheless, in 
our simulations, network trading is only closed to efficiency: although some simulations give 
a zero rationing, most of them generate a low but positive level of rationing. Maybe the main 
explanation is linked to the timing of the two models. Indeed, in Corominas-Bosch’s model,
all bargaining behaviors are simultaneous, whereas in our model they are sequential.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
What have we learned about the performance of network trading and marketplace trading in
terms of information dissemination and resource allocation?  
The first lesson deals with the levels of performance of network trading and marketplace 
trading (compared with a perfect benchmark institution). It appears that decentralized market 
institutions (such as network trading and marketplace trading) manage to generate an 
allocation of resources that is almost as good as Walrasian market, although they disseminate 
far fewer bits of information. This confirms Kirzner’s conjecture. It is thus possible to save 
the travel or communication costs required to assemble all the agents in the same place (either 
real or virtual). This explains why most real market institutions more closely resemble 
marketplace trading or network trading than a single Walrasian type market.  
The second lesson deals with the comparative performance of network trading and 
marketplace trading. In some cases, network trading proves better than marketplace trading 
in terms of information dissemination and resource allocation. This challenges the very 
widespread preconception whereby marketplace trading always leads to more transparency 
than network trading. This result is very important because the idea that marketplace trading
is always better has led to public policies: many developing countries have set up wholesale 
markets in order to improve market transparency. So, the result that network trading may lead
to more transparency and to a better allocation of resources should logically induce a total 
rethink of public policies in this area5. 
The third lesson deals with the type of environment in which each institution is better.
Simulations show that the variability of the supply (represented in the model by high values of 
HI and HZ) gives the advantage to network trading, whereas the atomicity of the supply 
(represented by nbPW) gives the advantage to marketplace trading. However, HI, HZ, and
nbPW have not the same level of importance. The more discriminant is HZ. When HZ ≥ 50%,
network trading is always better whatever the value of nbPW and HI (see Table 3). When HZ 
≤ 25%, the more discriminant element of the environment is nbPW. Indeed, for small values 
of nbPW, network trading almost always dominates (whatever the value of HI), whereas it is
the reverse for high values of nbPW. To sum up, we can say that network trading is relevant 
for environments with a high level of correlated hazard on supply to PWs or with a small 
number of PWs. By contrast, marketplace trading is adapted to environments with a low level
of correlated hazard on supply to PWs and with a high number of PWs. 
Does this result fit with empirical facts from cereals markets of West Africa? As we have 
already mentioned it, in this region, the wholesale trade is structured by network trading or by 
marketplace trading, depending on the country. While network trading prevails in Mali (and 
in the other Sahel countries), marketplace trading is dominant in Benin and in many other 
coastal countries. We have some empirical evidences that the correlated hazard on supply to
5 All the more so as the modelling involves various simplifications that underestimate the performance of
network trading and that overestimate the performance of marketplace trading. Indeed, in order to keep the 
model simple, transaction costs have not been integrated into the model. These costs of search (communication,
travel), negotiation, and enforcement are usually lower in the case of network trading because of the repetition of
transactions between the same wholesalers. Moreover, real network trading institutions sometimes involve some
mechanisms of flexibility (see section 2.2) that have not been included in the analysis. Last but not least, we 
assumed a perfect transparency at the level of marketplaces (see section 2.4), what is not always the case in the
real world (see section 2.2). 
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PWs (represented by HZ in the model) is high in Mali and relatively low in Benin (Galtier 
2002a). Indeed, this correlated hazard stems from shocks affecting simultaneously the sales of 
many producers of a given zone. As cereals are used by farmers both to feed their family 
(self-consumption) and as a source of cash income, cereal sales are often limited to what is 
strictly necessary to cover immediate cash requirements for the family (so as not to deplete 
the stores). Cereal sales depend therefore on shocks on producers’ cereals stocks, incomes and 
cash needs. We have some evidences that these kind of collective shocks affect much more 
Mali (and other Sahelian countries) than Benin (and other coastal countries). Indeed, in the 
Sahel zone, natural shocks are much stronger (lack of rainfall, locust attacks) and producers 
have a less diversified income and less access to credit. So, the correlated hazard on supply to
PWs is high in Mali and relatively low in Benin. As, in Mali, wholesale trade is structured by
network trading, this is consistent with the result of the model that network trading should 
prevail when HZ is high6 . Moreover, the number of PWs is low in Mali (only 3 to 15 PWs per
stockpiling locality), whereas it is relatively high in Benin (around 60 small-scale PWs, 
depending on the stockpiling localities) (Galtier 2002a). This fits well with the result of the 
model that marketplace trading should prevail when HZ is low and nbPW is high (as is the 
case in Benin). 
We also found two paradoxical results. The first one is that HI (which was expected to be 
managed better by marketplace trading) affects more marketplace trading than network 
trading. The second paradox is linked to the effect of nbPW on the performance of network 
trading. We expected nbPW to reduce the degree of connection between networks and, by 
doing so, to have a negative impact on the performance. We obtain this negative impact, but 
only when HI = 0. When HI > 0, nbPW benefits to network trading. How could we explain 
these paradoxes? HI represents the variability of supplies to PWs’ which is not correlated
between PWs. The ability of an institution to manage HI depends on the magnitude of
arbitrage between PWs. In marketplace trading, each CW can arbitrate between many PWs 
nbPW( in the simulations performed), whereas, in network trading, each CW can only 
3 
arbitrate between his correspondents PWs (two PWs in the simulations performed). So, it 
seems that marketplace trading should manage better HI than network trading.  
The only way to explain the first paradox is to assume some kind of broader arbitrage 
between PWs in the network trading institution. What is striking is that this explanation of the
first paradox allows us to understand also the second one. Indeed, if there is a form of broader 
arbitrage between PWs within network trading institution, nbPW may induce a dilution of the 
effect of HI (similar to the dilution effect that occur within marketplace trading institution). In
this case, nbPW has two effects on network trading performance: a negative due to the 
reduction of the degree of connection between networks and a positive one due to the dilution
of the effect of HI. The first one occurs even when HI = 0, whereas the second one occurs 
only when HI > 0. When HI = 0, only the negative effect is playing: nbPW has the expected
negative impact on network trading performance. When HI > 0, both effects are playing and, 
6 Another empirical confirmation of the link between HZ and network trading can be found in the way the
international trade of agricultural commodities is organized. This trade put in relation many production zones 
affected by natural hazards (climatic shocks, pests and diseases). Inside the zones, these hazards are correlated 
(they affect many farmers at the same time). On the contrary, at the international level, as the production zones
are far from each other, the shocks affecting them are not correlated. In such a situation, our model predicts that 
network trading is better. As a matter of fact, the international trade of the main agricultural commodities such as 
coffee or cocoa is based on network trading: importers buy always to the same exporters, arbitrating between 
different countries but very few between different exporters of the same country. (the existing exchanges such as
NYBOT or LIFFE are only used to hedge price risk, not to trade.)
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as the positive one proves to be stronger, nbPW has a positive impact on the performance. So, 
both paradoxes can be explained by the conjecture that there is some kind of broader 
arbitrage between PWs in the network trading institution. 
What can be this broader arbitrage between PWs that operates within network trading 
institution? As, in network trading, CWs only arbitrate between a small number of PWs (their 
correspondents), it can only be an indirect arbitrage between PWs. In network trading, there 
are only two possible types of indirect arbitrage. In the first one, the CWs arbitrate not only 
between their correspondents PWs, but also (indirectly) between other PWs. How is it 
possible? In network trading, CWs are connected to each others by their common 
correspondents PWs. In this way, they are indirectly connected with the correspondents PWs
of the CWs with whom they have at least a common PW. This might allow a form of indirect 
arbitrage between PWs. Indeed, as CWs act sequentially, the arbitrages performed by CW1 
(between PW1 and PW2) and by CW2 (between PW2 and PW3) generate a form of indirect 
arbitrage between PW1 and PW3 (through the stock of PW2). As this form of arbitrage is 
performed by the CWs, we will call it “CWs’ indirect arbitrage”. The second type of indirect 
arbitrage is performed by the consumers. Indeed, in consumption localities, consumers
arbitrate between CWs what represent a form of indirect arbitrage between PWs. We will call 
this type of arbitrage “consumers’ indirect arbitrage”. 
We tested our conjecture that a kind of broader arbitrage between PWs exists in the network
trading institution and is responsible for the observed paradoxes. Indeed, we performed a
new set of 900,000 simulations with the same 900 scenarios (see Table 1), but measuring the 
rationing at the level of each CW (and not at the level of each consumption locality as in the 
former simulations). In other words, we eliminated the arbitrage of consumers between CWs 
which implies that there is no “consumers’ indirect arbitrage” between PWs. The results are 
shown in Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. 
Table 9. Relevance domains of NETWORKS and PLACES for simulations without 
consumers’ indirect arbitrage 
nbPW
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,25 
0,5 
0,75 
1 
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
0,25 0 N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
0,25 0,25 N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
(HZ ; HI) 0,25 0,5 N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
0,25 0,75 N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
0,5 
0,5 
0,5 
0 
0,25 
0,5 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
0,75 
0,75 
0 
0,25 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
1 0 N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
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Table 10. The determinants of P [NETWORKS] – P [PLACES] (estimation of equation 12) 
for simulations without consumers’ indirect arbitrage  
R-squared = 0.8965 Adj R-squared = 0.8955
 Variables Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
HI 1179 4084,75 0,29 0,773 -6860 9218 
HZ 165081 4084,75 40,41 0,000 157043 173120 
nbpW -1280 63,76 -20,07 0,000 -1405 -1154 
Constant -17068 3288,23 -5,19 0,000 -23539 -10597 
Table 11. The effects of nbPW on P [PLACES] (estimation of equation 13) for simulations 
without consumers’ indirect arbitrage  
R-squared = 0.8892 Adj R-squared = 0.8881 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
HI -74311 6254,53 -11,88 0,000 -86620 -62002 
HZ -289962 6254,53 -46,36 0,000 -302271 -277653 
nbpW 738 97,63 7,55 0,000 545 930 
Constant 5947625 5034,90 1181,28 0,000 5937716 5957534 
Table 12. The effects of nbPW on P [PLACES] when HI = 0 (estimation of equation 14) for
simulations without consumers’ indirect arbitrage 
R-squared = 0.9891 Adj R-squared = 0.9888 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI (dropped) 
HZ -313871 3350,29 -93,68 0,000 -320520 -307221 
nbpW 5 68,47 0,07 0,947 -131 140 
Constant 5973450 2976,81 2006,66 0,000 5967542 5979358 
Table 13. The effects of nbPW on P [NETWORKS] (estimation of equation 15) for 
simulations without consumers’ indirect arbitrage 
R-squared = 0.8145 Adj R-squared = 0.8126 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI -73131 3611,73 -20,25 0,000 -80239 -66023 
HZ -124881 3611,73 -34,58 0,000 -131989 -117773 
nbpW -542 56,38 -9,62 0,000 -653 -431 
Constant 5930557 2907,45 2039,78 0,000 5924835 5936279 
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Table 14. The effects of nbPW on P [NETWORKS] when HI = 0 (estimation of equation 16) 
for simulations without consumers’ indirect arbitrage 
R-squared = 0.9558 Adj R-squared = 0.9549 
Variables Coef. Std. Error t P > | t | [95% Conf. Interval]
HI (dropped) 
HZ -142042 3165,56 -44,87 0,000 -148325 -135759 
nbpW -597 64,70 -9,23 0,000 -725 -469 
Constant 5931785 2812,67 2108,95 0,000 5926202 5937367 
First, as expected, the hypotheses H2, H3, and H3a (which have been confirmed by the former 
simulations) are also confirmed by the simulations without “consumers’ indirect arbitrage” 
(see Tables 10, 11, and 12). Second, hypothesis H3b is now confirmed (nbPW has a negative 
impact on network trading performance), which proves that “consumers indirect arbitrage” 
plays a decisive role in the explanation of the second paradox (see Tables 13 and 14). Third, 
the first paradox remains but is reduced. Indeed, in line with hypothesis H1, we were 
expecting HI to give the advantage to marketplace trading. The first set of simulations gives 
the opposite result, whereas simulations without “consumers’ indirect arbitrage” reveal that 
the impact of HI in the comparative performance of network trading and marketplace trading 
is not statistically significant (see Tables 4 and 10). This means that the first paradox is only 
partially explained by “consumers’ indirect arbitrage”. This confirms that “CWs’ indirect 
arbitrage” also plays a role.  
What is the economic interpretation of this? The significant impact of “CWs’ indirect 
arbitrage” means that the connection between CWs’ supply networks matters. The more
connected the networks, the better the information dissemination and the resource allocation.
The significant impact of “consumers’ indirect arbitrage” means that, in some environments, 
the superiority of network trading on marketplace trading stems from the downstream
arbitrages of consumers between CWs. (The comparison of Tables 3 and 9 shows that the 
relevance domain of network trading is more restricted without “consumers’ indirect 
arbitrage.”) How realistic is the hypothesis that consumers do not arbitrate? In West Africa,
some consumers have fidelity relations with wholesalers or retailers because they offer them
delayed payment. So, the real situation is in-between the perfect arbitrage (our first set of
simulations) and the complete lack of arbitrage (our second set of simulations). The two 
mechanisms of indirect arbitrage explain the surprising performance of network trading which 
proves to be, in many situations, better than marketplace trading.  
6. CONCLUSION 
We built a multi-agent model (called Markets) and performed simulations in order to study 
the information dissemination and allocation process inside two types of market institutions: 
network trading and marketplace trading. The results obtained by computer simulations have 
been validated with empirical data from cereal markets in West-Africa.  
Computer modelling of market processes with a multi-agent system proves to be an effective 
means to explain how effective resource allocation can result from the decentralized 
interactions of numerous individuals among whom the information is distributed. This tool is 
particularly useful to model market networks more complex (and realistic) than those usually
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studied in the literature. Other tools, such as game theory or market experiments, can also be
used for the same purpose (Smith, 1982; Roth, 2001; Balzer et al, 2001). Nevertheless, 
computer simulations are more effective than game theory for analyzing decentralized
markets where transactions take place « out of equilibrium ». They make it possible to involve 
far more agents than experiments and also to simulate trading processes over a much longer 
time period. Nevertheless, all these tools are complementary.  
We found some interesting results about the role of market networks. First, the topology of the 
market network matters: it proves to have a significant impact on market transparency and
performance. So, it is necessary to analyze the network of real markets that are often much 
more complex than the centralized networks generally studied in the literature. Second,
decentralized and incomplete communication networks such as those of network trading and 
marketplace trading can lead to a good resource allocation, although they disseminate far 
fewer bits of information than the Walrasian market. Third, network trading may be better 
than marketplace trading for market transparency and resource allocation (contrary to a very 
common preconception). Last but not least, we showed some new results about the network 
trading institution. The more interesting one is that network trading does not lead to a 
segmentation of the market: the connection between networks (even low) and the downstream 
arbitrage of the consumers are sufficient to generate a good dissemination of information and 
a good allocation of resources. 
These results can have great implications for market design and public policy. Indeed, as 
many current policies favor marketplace trading, the result that marketplace trading is not
always better than network trading for market transparency and resource allocation should be 
of great interest for market design. The model can also be used in the design of market 
information systems (MIS) that collect and disseminate price information by radio or SMS in
order to make the market more transparent (Dembélé and Staatz, 1989; Galtier and Egg, 
2003). 
Let us now consider some of the avenues for further research opened up by this work: 
Introduce heterogeneity (especially irregular networks). In the current version of the model,
all the agents of a category (PWs, CWs) are identical. The next step for us is to introduce 
heterogeneous agents. There are several ways to do this: agents may differ in number of 
connections, behavioral rules, endowments, or risk aversion. Introducing agents with different 
number of connections is of special interest. Indeed, there is a strong hypothesis in the 
literature that only regular networks can be efficient (Kranton and Minehart, 2001; 
Corominas-Bosch, 2004;  Ozsoylev, 2005). It can be very interesting to test this hypothesis 
and also to characterize more precisely the relation between regularity and efficiency (which 
is strongly linked to indirect arbitrage). Another interesting subject is related to agents’ 
behavioral rules. For instance, in marketplace trading, we can introduce two types of agents, 
one with the strategy to choose randomly the marketplace (as in the current version of the 
model) and one with the strategy to go to the marketplace which had the lowest price in t – 1.
We can also introduce a learning process in order to render endogenous the strategy of each 
agent. The introduction of agents with different levels of endowment can allow us to assess 
the performance not only at the level of the whole market but also at less aggregated levels 
(for instance, different classes of consumers).   
Analyze the emergence of institutions. In this article, we used computer simulations to assess 
the efficiency of a market with given institutions. Introducing the transaction costs endured by 
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the agents, it is possible to explore the processes involved in the emergence of such
institutions (Kirman and Vriend, 2000). It is of special interest to cross both types of analysis 
in order to check if efficient networks can emerge from the decentralized behaviors of rational 
agents incurring costs to build links (Kranton and Minehart, 2001; Jackson, 2003; Bramoullé
and Kranton, 2007). 
Introduce the problem of moral hazard and analyze its consequences on market networks’ 
efficiency. Indeed, apart from the dispersal among economic agents of information relative to 
endowments, costs and preferences, limited information on agents’ ability and honesty may 
lead to problems in performing transactions (Williamson, 1985; Hoff et al., 1993). This may 
have an impact on information dissemination processes within markets. For example, in
Benin, consumption zone wholesalers who have to travel widely in the production zones of
the country, entrust maize sales to brokers (paid on a commission basis). However, this brings 
in a problem of moral hazard, since these brokers, whose behavior cannot be observed, may 
be tempted to distort the sales proposals made by wholesalers, thereby introducing a source of 
“noise” in communication within the market (Galtier, 2002b). A solution can be the 
dissemination of information on unreliable agents (Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif 1993). But, if 
the same network plays both the role of a transaction network and of an information network 
on unreliable agents, this can also have a strong impact on network efficiency (Bloch et al.
2008). 
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